MARITIME: SUPREME COURT 5-4 ALLOWS PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR SEAMEN REFUSED MAINTENANCE AND CURE Splitting 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court held June 25 that injured seamen may seek punitive damages when their employer willfully fails to pay them for maintenance--food and lodging--and cure--medical care (Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, U.S., No. 08-214, 6/25/09). Writing for the court majority, Justice Clarence Thomas found that punitive damages have long been an accepted remedy for common law claims under general maritime law, including claims for maintenance and cure. He rejected the argument of Atlantic Sounding Co., the owner of a tugboat on which crew member Edgar Townsend was injured, that the Jones Act, enacted in 1920, eliminated the availability of punitive damages. The Jones Act "created a statutory cause of action for negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing remedies available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based on a seaman's right to maintenance and cure," for seamen and did not affect existing common law claims and remedies. Thomas also rejected Atlantic Sounding's argument that the court's prior means that seamen are limited to remedies that are available under the Jones Act, which courts have held does not allow for punitive damages. Miles addressed "whether general maritime law should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness," a claim that was not available before the Jones Act, Thomas said. He found that unlike in Miles, in the present case "both the general maritime cause of action (maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well established before the passage of the Jones Act." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined in the majority opinion. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote the dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Alito asserted that Miles "provided a workable framework for analyzing the relief available on claims under general maritime law" and objected that the majority "abruptly change[d] course." Miles "instructs that, in exercising our authority to develop general maritime law, we should be guided primarily by the policy choices reflected in statutes creating closely related claims," Alito claim, we should be reluctant to permit such relief on a similar claim brought under general maritime law." The Supreme Court long has recognized that punitive damages are not available under the Federal Employers Liability Act, Alito said. By incorporating FELA into the Jones Act, Congress "must have intended to incorporate FELA's limitation on damages as well," Alito said. He asserted that under Miles "the rule should be the same when a seaman sues under general maritime law for personal injury resulting from the denial of maintenance and cure." Sailors' Union Attorney Applauds Ruling. John R. Hillsman of McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky in San Francisco helped prepare an amicus brief filed in the case on behalf of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific. He applauded the court's ruling, saying it resolves a 15- year controversy, but said some courts also have used Miles to prohibit punitive damages for unseaworthiness and negligence claims brought by seamen. "We won the battle, but we haven't won the war yet," Hillsman said. He argued that courts should apply the Atlantic Sounding decision to unseaworthiness and negligence claims. the four justices who are considered liberals--is "remarkable," Hillsman said. Thomas properly acknowledged that the Jones Act was intended to expand remedies for injured seamen, not restrict them, Hillsman said. Various attorneys who represented the parties or amici curiae did not return calls for comment. Injured While Working on Tugboat. While working as a deck hand on a tugboat in the port of Miami, Townsend fell on the steel deck and injured his arm and shoulder. Atlantic Sounding, the owner of the tugboat, refused to provide maintenance and cure. The owner filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. Townsend filed a separate suit under the Jones Act and general maritime law, alleging negligence, unseaworthiness, willful failure to pay maintenance and cure, and wrongful termination. He also brought similar counterclaims in the owner's suit and sought punitive damages for willful denial of maintenance and cure. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida consolidated the cases and denied Atlantic Sounding's motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. Hearing an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that punitive damages are available for willful Cir. 2007) ). Other federal appeals courts and some state courts had reached the opposite result. The Supreme Court granted review last November (213 DLR C-1, 11/4/08) and heard oral argument in March (39 DLR AA-1, 3/3/09). Punitive Damages Long Available Under Common Law. "Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct," Thomas said. He found that during the colonial era under English common law, juries were given "broad discretion" to award damages, including "punitive damages when the circumstances of the case warranted" and that American courts have permitted punitive damages "in appropriate cases since at least 1784." "The general rule that punitive damages were available at common law extended to claims arising under federal maritime law," Thomas said. He found that punitive damages "were available in maritime actions for tortious acts of a particularly egregious nature" and that "[n]othing in maritime law undermines the applicability of this general rule in the maintenance and cure context." The obligation under maritime law to provide maintenance and cure "dates back centuries" and has been recognized by the Supreme Court, Thomas adequate medical care was the basis for awarding punitive damages in cases decided as early as the 1800's." He concluded that "the pre-Jones Act evidence indicates that punitive damages remain available" for maintenance and cure claims "under the appropriate factual circumstances." Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 to overrule a Supreme Court decision holding that prohibited seamen or their families from recoveries for injuries or death caused by employer negligence, Thomas said. The statute provides that an injured seaman or a deceased seaman's personal representative "may elect to The Jones Act provision incorporates FELA, which covers injured railway workers. The Jones Act's use of the word "elect" shows that although the statute created a statutory claim for negligence, the Jones Act did not eliminate already existing common law claims, including maintenance and cure, Thomas said. He found that "the only statutory restrictions expressly addressing general maritime claims for maintenance and cure were enacted long after the passage of the Jones Act." Congress limited the availability of maintenance and cure claims for foreign workers on offshore oil and mineral production facilities and for students and instructors at sailing schools, he said. The Supreme Court consistently has recognized that the Jones Act was "Nothing in the text of the Jones Act or this Court's decisions issued in the wake of its enactment undermines the continued existence of the common-law cause of action providing recovery for the delayed or improper provision of maintenance and cure," he said. Miles Inapplicable to This Case, Thomas Says. Atlantic Sounding also argued that the court's 1990 decision in Miles limits remedies for injured seamen to those available under the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act. That interpretation of Miles "is far too broad," Thomas said. He found that Miles did not address claims for maintenance and cure or the availability of punitive damages for such claims and instead addressed "the entirely different question whether general maritime law should provide a cause of action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness." "By providing a remedy for wrongful death suffered on the high seas or in territorial waters, the Jones Act and the DOHSA displaced a general maritime rule that denied any recovery for wrongful death," Thomas said. He found that the Supreme Court "was called upon in Miles to decide whether these new statutes supported an expansion of the relief available under pre-existing general maritime law to harmonize it with a cause of action created by seaman but followed the example of the Jones Act and DOHSA by prohibiting damages for loss of society and for lost future earnings, Thomas said. "Unlike the situation presented in Miles, both the general maritime cause of action (maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well established before the passage of the Jones Act," Thomas said. He also found that because the Jones Act "does not address maintenance and cure or its remedy," it is "possible to adhere to the traditional understanding of maritime actions and remedies without abridging or violating the Jones Act." Atlantic Sounding's "contention that Miles precludes any action or remedy for personal injury beyond that made available under the Jones Act was directly rejected" by the Supreme Court in Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 69 USLW 4410 (2001), Thomas said. He found that Garris "recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death attributable to negligence although neither the Jones Act (which applies only to seamen) nor DOHSA (which does not cover territorial waters) provided such a remedy." Thomas recognized that "the negligent denial of maintenance and cure may also be the subject of a Jones Act claim" and that "seamen commonly seek to recover under the Jones Act for the wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure." But that "does not mean that the Jones Act provides the only remedy for maintenance and cure claims," Thomas said. He found that the court in Cortes seaman's right to choose among overlapping statutory and common-law remedies for injuries sustained by the denial of maintenance and cure." "The laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does not require the narrowing of available remedies to the lowest common denominator approved by Congress for distinct causes of action," Thomas said.
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Sunday, June 28, 2009
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Would it be possible for the owner of this blog to contact me at my email, I have a question. My name is Steve Gordon and my email is sgordon@gordon-elias.com. Thank you very much and it was a great article!
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